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THE COST OF APPRAISAL RIGHTS: HOW TO
RESTORE CERTAINTY IN DELAWARE
MERGERS
Matthew Evans Miehl*
Delaware's legislature created appraisal rights to
ensure that minority shareholders received fair
compensation for shares that were involuntarilysold in
a merger. Modern securities practices blur the line
between a share's equity interest and its voting interest,
which enables appraisal arbitrage-individuals,
particularly hedge funds, petitioning for appraisal
rights over shares that another person has the voting
rights to. Instances of appraisalarbitragein Delaware
mergers are soaring and causing corporate buyers to be
uncertain about a merger's ultimate price. This Note
contends that Delaware's legislature can ameliorate
this problem by establishing a contemporaneous
ownership requirement and by initiating efforts to
centralize share exchanges.
Legal scholars have
discussed the benefits and costs of a contemporaneous
ownership requirement and a centralized share
exchange, but those discussions fail to consider the
implicationsfor corporate buyers.
A practical solution to the issue of appraisal
arbitrage is developed by looking at the current state of
appraisalrights through the lens of a corporate buyer.
Currently, corporate buyers must weigh the benefits of
a merger against the merger's foreseeable risks, a task
that appraisal arbitrage makes more difficult. These
buyers might attempt to mitigate these risks with
protective terms or deal restructurings, both of which

Matthew Miehl is a JD/MBA student at the University of Georgia School of Law and
Terry College of Business. He graduated from Indiana University in 2015 with a degree in
psychology and has since started a business and participated in various types of M&A
transactions.
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may leave shareholders in a worse
Nevertheless, the solution posited in this
rectify corporate buyers' interests through a
accountabilityand verification that may also
enhance corporategovernance.
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I. INTRODUCTION

More than half of the publicly-traded corporations in the United
States and 66% of Fortune 500 corporations are incorporated in
Its legislature and judicial system are respected
Delaware.1
because they create flexible, current corporate statutes and are, in
part, a reason why many corporations choose to incorporate in
Delaware. 2 Recently, appraisal rights filings have increased in
Delaware, 3 and more dissenting shareholders are turning to the
court to value their shares of corporate stock that were
Among the most prevalent
involuntarily sold in a merger.
appraisal petitioners are strategic professional investors, such as
hedge funds, who purchase shares of the seller's stock intending to
seek appraisal rights over those shares, 4 sometimes getting
returns well above 100%.5 These professional investors are called
''appraisal arbitrageurs," and these arbitrageurs make ultimate
merger prices uncertain. 6 It is for this reason that Delaware's
legislature should prohibit shareholders from petitioning for
appraisal rights over shares acquired after the record date and

1 About Agency, DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, http://www.corp.delaware.gov/about
agency.shtml (last visited Sept. 11, 2017).
2 See Lewis S. Black, Jr., Why Corporations Choose Delaware,DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF
-STATE (2007), https://corp.delaware.gov/whycorporations-web.pdf (claiming that corporations
incorporate in Delaware because it has "one of the most advanced and flexible corporation
statutes," a "highly-respected corporations court," and "takes seriously its role in keeping the
corporation statute and other business laws current).
3 See Wei Jiang et al., Appraisal: Shareholder Remedy or Litigation Arbitrage?, 59 J.L.
ECON. 697, 704 (2016) (showing an increase from 20/,3% of all appraisal-eligible deals having
subsequent appraisal litigation from 2000-2003 to 20-/o-25% of all appraisal-eligible deals
from 2010-2014).
4 See id. at 704-06, 699 (stating that hedge funds are "by far" the predominant force among
appraisal petitioners, making up 73.8% of all appraisal claims, and that the top seven hedge
fund-petitioners represented more than 50% of the dollar volume in appraisal cases).
6 See, e.g., In re Appraisal of Orchard Enters., Inc., C.A. No. 5713-cs., 2012 WL 2923305
(Del. Ch. July 18, 2012) (ruling that a $2.05/share offer undervalued the seller's shares and
concluded that $4.67/share was a proper value at the time of merger); see also In re Sunbelt
Beverage Corp. Shareholder Litigation, C.A. No. 1608-cc, 2010 WL 26539 (Del. Ch. Jan. 5,
2010) (holding that $45.83/share undervalued the seller's shares and arriving at a judicial fair
value of $114.04/share); Jiang et al., supra note 3, at 721 (showing that petitioners' average
returns are 108% and 57% from judicial determinations and settlements, respectively).
6 See Jason Mei, Appraisal Arbitrage: Investment Strategy of Hedge Funds and
Shareholder Activists, 34 REv. BANKING & FIN. L. 83, 89 (2014) (citation omitted) (noting
that a purchaser's increasing uncertainty is a "major implication" of appraisal arbitrage).
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should initiate efforts to restructure share exchanges to include a
centralized database that monitors and records share transactions.
Without legislative interference, corporate buyers might mitigate
their risk by resorting to self-help remedies such as deal
restructurings, withholding cash in anticipation of subsequent
appraisal petitions, or including contractual provisions that cap
appraisal claims-all of which may negatively affect the nonpetitioning shareholders. 7 Although Delaware's legislature recently
amended its appraisal rights statute, Title 8, § 262 of the Delaware
Code,8 these amendments undervalue the cost of appraisal
arbitrage because arbitrageurs may still buy shares after the record
date and exploit empty voting.9 With a record date cut-off, we will
not dispute petitioners' propriety and a corporate buyer's
transactional certainty may better reflect the merits of the
transaction. 10 Moreover, a centralized database recording a share's
chain of title might resolve issues with share depositories that hold
shares in fungible bulk as well as elicit clearer governance
mechanisms in corporate disputes.1 1
Part II of this Note introduces the history, requirements, and
trends of appraisal rights in Delaware.
Part III delves into
appraisal arbitrage and discusses recent amendments to
Delaware's appraisal rights statute. Part IV argues that these
amendments fail to resolve pivotal issues with appraisal arbitrage
and may cause buyers to engage in self-help. Part V identifies
solutions to these issues, specifically prohibiting petitioners from
seeking appraisal over shares acquired after the record date and
centralizing share exchanges. Lastly, Part VI summarizes the
issues and arguments made in this Note.

7 See infra Part IV.
8 DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 262 (West 2017).

9 See In re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., No. Civ. A. 1554-CC, 2007 WL
1378345, at *4-5 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2007) (holding that the petitioners may seek appraisal
rights over shares bought after the record date).
10 See infra Part V.A.
11 See infra Part V.
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SYNOPSIS OF APPRAISAL RIGHTS IN DELAWARE

Appraisal rights became a dissenting shareholder's post-merger
remedy in the early 1900s. 12 Until that point, there were no
dissenting shareholders after a merger because corporate mergers
required unanimous shareholder approval, which gave every
shareholder a veto power that could impede any fundamental
Delaware's legislature annulled minority
corporate action. 13
shareholders' veto powers by replacing unanimous approval with
majority approval. 14 This shift enabled majority shareholders to
15
squeeze out minority shareholders at prices below fair value.
Thus, appraisal rights were created to ensure fair compensation
16
for shareholders who involuntarily sold their shares in a merger.
Delaware codified this "right" by creating an appraisal rights
statute, § 262.17
Unlike parties in traditional litigation, both parties in an
appraisal suit bear the burden of proving that their respective
calculations best reflect the transaction's fair value.1 8 The statute
unambiguously calls on the Court of Chancery to calculate the
disputed shares' fair value by taking into consideration "all
relevant factors."1 9 However, the economic concept and judicial
concept of "fair value" differ. The economic concept of fair value is
"the price that would be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer

12 See George S. Geis, An Appraisal Puzzle, 105 Nw. U. L. REv. 1635, 1642 (2011) (citation
omitted) (noting that appraisal rights mushroomed in the early 1900s).
13 Transkaryotic, 2007 WL 1378345, at *9 (citation omitted).
14 See id. (citation omitted) (claiming that Delaware's legislature replaced unanimous
approval with majority approval to circumvent all shareholders' veto powers).
15 Geis, supra note 12, at 1642-43 (citation omitted).
16 See Transkaryotic,2007 WL 1378345, at *3 ("[Ihe Legislature createdappraisal rights
in an effort to compensate minority holders for the loss of the veto power and to give
dissenters the right to demand fair value of shares.'); In re Appraisal of Dole Food Co., 114
A.3d 541, 548 (Del. Ch. 2014) ("An appraisal is a 'legislative remedy which is intended to
provide shareholders, who dissent from a merger asserting the inadequacy of the offering
price, with an independent judicial determination of the fair value of their shares.'"
(quoting Alabama By-Products Corp. v. Neal, 588 N2d 255, 256 (Del. 1991))).
17 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (West 2017).
18 See Dole Food Co., 114 A.3d at 550 (noting that each party has the burden of proving

the constituent elements of their respective valuations, including the particular method,
discounts, modifications, or premiums used, by a preponderance of the evidence).
19 Tit. 8, § 262(h); see id. § 262(a) (stating that appraisal petitioners are "entitled to an
appraisal by the Court of Chancery).
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a liability";20 the judicial concept of fair value is judge-made and
ripe with policy aimed at compensating shareholders for their pro
21
rata interest in the corporation as a going concern.
Further, this reliance on the court's ultimate determination
creates the fallacious impression that there is a "best" fair value
figure. Valuation is an art, not a science, and a share's fair value
spans a range of reasonable values that vary depending on the
method employed, the factors considered, and the weight that each
factor is given. 22 What constitutes "all relevant factors" varies
case-by-case, 23 and the only axiom of this process is that the
judicially determined fair value must exclude any "value arising
from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger."24 In
practice, the court typically employs a Discounted Cash Flow
(DCF) analysis, which utilizes cash'flow projections, a terminal
25
value, and discount rate.
However, before the court can calculate the shares' fair value, the
petition must be valid.
Delaware's appraisal statute has
transactional requirements that the transacting corporations must
satisfy. Likewise, the petitioning shareholders and target/surviving
20 Maria

Constantinou

et al., Fair Value Measurement, 2015 Global Edition,
1-3 (2015), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/cfodirect/assets/pdf/accou
nting-guides/pwc-fair-value-measurement-2015.pdf.
21 See Finkelstein v. Liberty Dig., Inc., No. Civ. A. 19598, 2005 WL 1074364, at *12 (Del.
Ch. Apr. 25, 2005) (noting that the judicial concept is "largely judge-made" and "freighted
with policy consideration"); see also Cooper v. Pabst Brewing Co., Civ. A. No. 7244, 1993 WL
208763, at *2 (Del. Ch. June 8, 1993) (stating that shareholders are compensated for what
was taken from them-their interest is a going concern).
22 See In reAppraisal of Dell Inc., C.A_ No. 9322-VCL, 2016 WL 3186538, at *22 (Del. Ch.
May 31, 2016) (stating that a corporation's value is not a point on a line, but a range of
reasonable values with the judge assigning one that is the most reasonable using all
relevant evidence and fairness (quoting Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., No. Civ. A. 7129,
2003 WL 23700218, at *2 (Del. Ch. July 9, 2004), affd in part, rev'd on other grounds, 884
A.2d 26 (Del. 2005))).
2 Compare Dell, 2016 WL 3186538, at *23-25 n.13 (declining to consider deal price as a
"relevant factor"), with Huff Fund Inv. P'ship v. CKx, Inc., Civil Action No. 6844-VCG, 2013
WL 5878807, at *11 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 2013) (considering deal price as a relevant factor).
24 Tit. 8, § 262(h).
25 See Dell, 2016 WL 3186538, at *45 (claiming that DCF is the prominent method in the
Chancery Court and uses three discrete steps: estimating future cash flow, attributing cash
flow that is expected at the end of a discrete period (terminal value), and discounting the
cash flow value and terminal value (citation omitted)). But, DCF is not a staple in
appraisal cases. See, e.g., Merion Capital LP v. BMC Software, Inc., C.A. No. 8900-VCG,
2015 WL 6164771, at *18 (Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 2015) (deferring to the merger price instead of
DCF because of the "uncertainties in the DCF analysis").
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS
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corporation must adhere to § 262's procedural requirements. If
dissenting shareholders satisfy the transactional requirements and
the initial procedural requirements are satisfied, then those
shareholders may petition for appraisal rights over their eligible
26
shares.
A. TRANSACTIONAL REQUIREMENTS

The broadest transactional requirement of § 262 is the marketout exception, which only allows shareholders of corporations that
A
do not "market-out" to petition for appraisal rights. 27
corporation markets-out if it is listed on a national securities
exchange, such as NASDAQ or NYSE, or has more than 2,000
record holders. 28 Nevertheless, shareholders of corporations that
market-out may still petition for appraisal rights if the
29
shareholders received cash for their shares, in part or in whole.
This exception to the exception is called the "Wall Street Rule" and
is premised on the idea that stock-for-stock transactions do not
compromise a shareholder's autonomy because the shareholder
may still voluntarily cash-out by selling his shares on the open
market if the new shares are unsatisfactory. 30 Ultimately, the
market-out exception affects about 10% of all domestic mergers
because roughly 90% of mergers involve cash either in whole or in
part. 31 But, any corporation, whether it market-outs or not, can

27

See generally tit. 8, § 262(b)-(g).
Id. § 262(b)(1).

28

Id.

26

29 See id. § 262(b)(2) (stating that shareholders of corporations that market-out may still

seek appraisal for their shares if the merger consideration was not (a) stock of the surviving
corporation or (b) stock of another corporation that meets the market-out exception); see
also Louisiana Mun. Police Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. Crawford, 918 A.2d 1172, 1192 (Del. Ch.
2007) (holding that shareholders who received partial cash and stock payments are entitled
to appraisal rights).
30 See ROBERT J. RHEE, ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS OF BUSINESS FOR LAWYERS 161 (Wolters

Kluwer, 2d ed. 2012) (claiming the only remedy for most disappointed shareholders is the
"Wall Street Rule," which reflects the shareholder's ability to sell the shares of stock that
disappoint his expectations on the stock market).
31 See David B. Feirstein et al., Appraisal Rights - The Next Frontier in Deal Litigation?,
M&A Updates, KIRKLAND & ELLIS UPDATE 1 (May 1, 2013), https://www.kirkland.com/siteFi
les[Publications/MAUpdate050113.pdf (claiming that approximately 90% of domestic M&A
transactions in recent years used cash as all or part of the deal's currency).
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vest its shareholders with appraisal rights by way of a provision in
its certificate of incorporation. 32
B. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS

In addition to satisfying the transactional requirements, the
petitioning shareholders and the selling corporation must satisfy
procedural requirements. Each shareholder must "opt-in" to the
appraisal suit by following the statutory procedures. 33 The selling
corporation must notify its shareholders of their appraisal rights
within the statutory time frame. 34 Shareholders may only petition
for appraisal rights once all of the requirements are satisfied.
The procedural requirements for shareholders in an appraisal
rights suit are unique because appraisal rights suits do not
recognize class representation.3 5 Unlike derivative suits and other
class actions that automatically aggregate all existing
shareholders into the plaintiff class, appraisal rights require each
shareholder to opt-in to the appraisal suit by petitioning for
appraisal rights. 36 First, the shareholder must deliver a demand
to the corporation prior to the merger vote notifying the
corporation of his identity and his intent to seek appraisal rights
over his shares.3 7 Unlike other jurisdictions such as New York and
Texas, 38 Delaware's demand requirement is simple because
petitioners need not quantify how many shares they want
32 See tit. 8, § 262(c) ("Any corporation may provide ... appraisal rights.., as a result of
an amendment to its certificate of incorporation .... ").
33 See Bradley R. Aronstam, R. Franklin Balotti & Timo Rehbock, Delaware's GoingPrivate Dilemma: Fostering ProtectionsFor Minority Shareholders in the Wake of Siliconix
and Unocal Exploration, 58 BUS. LAW. 519, 547 (2003) (noting that appraisal petitioners
must opt-in to an appraisal suit to benefit from a judicial holding).
'4 See tit. 8, § 262(d)(1) (stating that the selling corporation must notify its stockholders
of their appraisal rights and include a copy of section 262 at least twenty days prior to the
meeting).
35 See Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage and the Future of Public
Company M&A, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1551, 1561-62 (2015) (acknowledging that appraisal
petitioners do not have class representation).
36 Tit. 8, § 262(d)(1). See Aronstam, Balotti & Rehbock, supra note 33, at 547 (claiming
that
appraisal petitioners must opt-in to an appraisal suit to benefit from a judicial holding).
37 Tit. 8, § 262(d)(1).
38 See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 623(c) (McKinney 2017) (requiring shareholders to quantify
the number of shares they want appraised in their demand); TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE ANN.
§ 10.356(b)(3)(D) (West 2017) (requiring shareholders to quantify the number of shares they
want appraised in their demand).
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appraised. 39 Next, the petitioner must dissent or abstain from the
merger, 40 continuously hold the shares through the merger's
effective date,4 1 and then file a petition with the Delaware Court of
Chancery no more than 120 days after the merger's effective
42
date.
Although shareholders bear the burden of filing an appraisal
petition, the selling corporation must abide by the procedures
established in § 262(d)(1). 43 This subsection requires the selling
corporation to notify its shareholders of their appraisal rights by
sending them a copy of Delaware's appraisal statute at least
twenty days prior to the shareholders' meeting where shareholders
vote on the merger. 44 The corporation must also set a record date
between ten and sixty days before the shareholders' meeting to
determine which shareholders are eligible to vote and receive
pertinent voting materials. 45 On average, a record date is set fifty46
four days after the proposed merger's announcement, which
provides shareholders with sufficient time to research the
transaction and decide whether to cash-out or maintain their
equity interest before the record date. 47 Setting a record date
ameliorates the risks associated with empty voting48-individuals

39 Tit. 8, § 262; see also Gaurav Jetley & Xinyu Ji, Appraisal Arbitrage - Is There a
Delaware Advantage?, 71 Bus. LAw. 427, 435 (2016) (noting that a petitioner's demand need
not include the number of shares she wants appraised).
40 Tit. 8, § 262(a); see also In re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., No. Civ. A.
1544-cc, 2007 WL 1378345, at *2 (Del. Ch. 2007) (stating that abstaining shares are
considered dissenting votes).
41 Tit. 8, § 262(a).
42 Id. § 262(e).
43 Id. § 262(d)(1).

-4Id.
45 Id. § 213(a).
46

Jetley & Ji, supra note 39, at 441.

47 See Geis, supra note 12, at 1666 (providing advanced notice to shareholders gives them

adequate time to "muster information, evaluate competing proposals, and make up their
minds about an issue").
48 See JEFFREY D. BAUMAN & RUSSELL B. STEVENSON, JR., CORPORATIONS LAW AND
POLICY 474 (West 8th ed. 2013) ("[Section 213(a)] is intended to provide the board with
greater flexibility in aligning stockholders' voting and economic interests while minimizing
the issues that arise when a stockholder holds a voting interest for stock it no longer owns
at the time of the meeting.").
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selling their shares after the record date but retaining their
49
shares' voting rights.
In essence, shareholders of corporations that do not market-out
and receive cash for at least some of their shares may be eligible
for appraisal rights. So long as the petitioners effectively opt in to
the appraisal proceeding and do not approve the merger, then they
may petition for the appraisal of those shares.
Although
Delaware's appraisal statute is clear, it fails to address
shareholders who petition for shares that were bought after the
record date and lack voting rights.

III. APPRAISAL ARBITRAGE AND RECENT AMENDMENTS
With the policy and procedures of appraisal rights established,
we now delve into the intricacies of appraisal arbitrage. Appraisal
arbitrage is an investment strategy where investors, typically hedge
funds, 50 purchase the undervalued seller's shares with the intent of
seeking appraisal rights over those shares.5 1 Unlike the proverbial
"mom and pop" investors and other traditional appraisal petitioners
that hold an equity position in a corporation prior to a merger
announcement, arbitrageurs take their equity position in the
corporation after a merger announcement and may continuously
buy shares past the record date and sometimes past the merger's
approval. 52 Arbitrageurs have recently started exploiting appraisal
rights as an investment tool and are filing an increasing number of
49 See Geis, supra note 12, at 1653 (defining empty voting as a situation where an actor
retains a share's voting rights without retaining the share's economic interest).
10 See Jiang et al., supra note 3, at 699, 704-06 (stating that hedge funds represent 73.8% of
appraisal claims with the top seven hedge funds representing more than 50% of the total
dollar volume awarded in appraisal suits); see also Jetley & Ji, supra note 39, at 428 (stating
that one hedge fund, Merion Capital, has over $1 billion invested in appraisal claims (citing
Liz Hoffman, Hedge Funds Plan to Seek HigherPrice for Safeway, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 2, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/hedge-funds-plan-to-seek-higher-price-for.safeway1422913728)).
51 See Merion Capital LP v. BMC Software, Inc., C.A. No. 8900-VCG, 2015 WL 67586, at
*1 (Del. Ch. Jan. 5, 2015) (defining appraisal arbitrage as an investment strategy in which
investors purchase stock with the specific intention of exercising appraisal rights).
52 See, e.g., Merion Capital,2015 WL 67586, at *1 (adjudicating an appraisal suit brought
by petitioners who acquired stock after the announcement of the merger); In re Appraisal of
Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., No. CIV. A. 1544-cc, 2007 WL 1378345, at *4 (Del. Ch. May
2, 2007) (holding that the petitioners may seek appraisal rights over shares bought after the
record date); see Letter from Bruce Silverstein, Esq., to Travis Letter, Vice Chancellor, Del.
Ch. (Dec. 27, 2013) (stating that appraisal arbitrageurs acquired many of their shares after
the record date and some after the merger's approval In re Appraisal of Dole Food Co.).
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There are two non-mutually exclusive
appraisal petitions. 53
rationales attributed to this increase: interest returns and the
holding in Transkaryotic that validated empty voting in appraisal
rights cases. 54 In response to the influx of appraisal petitions,
Delaware's legislature amended § 262 in August 2016.
A. APPRAISAL ARBITRAGE

Appraisal arbitrage is a double-edged sword. It is beneficial
because professional investors serve as shareholder activists that
spot inefficient pricing and protect small shareholders from
expropriation by the majority. 55 Further, a robust appraisal
arbitrage market solves some of the collective action problems that
impede otherwise meritorious claims without generating agency
problems.5 6 One example of arbitrageurs solving a collective
action problem is called "systematic exploitation of the large by the
small," where small shareholders piggyback off of the arbitrageur's
financial efforts and get their shares appraised without incurring
57
their proportionate litigation costs.
Yet, some criticize appraisal arbitrage as "pervert[ing] the goals
of the appraisal suit by allowing it to be used as an investment tool
for arbitrageurs as opposed to a statutory safety net for objecting
stockholders."5 8 Business professors at Columbia University and
Vanderbilt University confirmed this idea in their study that
showed "hedge funds are by far the dominant force among
appraisal petitioners." 59 In fact, since 2007, individual investors
initiating a petition for appraisal rights dropped almost 15%;
53 See Jiang et al., supra note 3, at 704-06 (showing that hedge funds represent 73.8% of
appraisal petitioners).
See infra Part III.A.1-2.
55 See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 35, at 1555 (advocating that appraisal arbitrage
serves as an "effective back-end check on expropriation in merger transactions").
5 Id. at 1556.
57 See Robert Charles Clarke, CorporateLaw, in BAUMAN & STEVENSON, supra note 48,
at 651 (describing "systematic exploitation of the large by the small" as large shareholders
incurring the costs of litigation so smaller shareholders may reap the benefits without
bearing their percentage of the costs).
58 Trevor Norwitz, A Debate: Is the Delaware Appraisal Rights Remedy in Need of Repair?,
BUS. L. TODAY (Jan. 2017) (quotation omitted), htps://www.americanbar.orglcontent/damJaba/
publicationsblt/2017/01/data-201701.autocheckdam.pdf.
59 Jiang et al., supra note 3, at 704; see id. at 704-06 (showing that hedge funds represent
73.8% of appraisal petitioners).
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meanwhile, appraisal petitions have increased from roughly 2%3% of eligible deals in the early 2000s to 20%-25% in recent years
with average gross returns soaring from 39% to 88%.60 This
increase is attributed to two factors-petitioners recovering
higher-than-average interest and Delaware courts appraising
shares purchased after the record date.
1.
Interest Returns.
Unlike traditional interest that
compensates for the market rate of return, Delaware courts use
interest to compensate shareholders for the risk associated with
appraisal litigation and for the opportunity costs associated with
forgoing compensation at the merger's closing. 61 Interest in
appraisal suits accrues at 5% above the Federal Reserve discount
rate between the closing date of the merger and the ultimate date
of payment while compounding quarterly. 62 Thus, the recovered
interest significantly boosts a petitioner's returns. In fact, average
returns from accrued interest is roughly 58%.63
High interest not only boosts expected returns, but also
mitigates the risk of arbitrageurs losing money. 64 To illustrate, if
the court finds that the transaction was at fair value, then
petitioners still make some profit arising from interest accruing on
the withheld money at a rate of nearly 6% and compounding
quarterly over the 800 days an appraisal suit typically lasts. 65
With a 5.75% rate of return, appraisal arbitrage is a profitable

60 See id. at 704, 721 (showing that appraisal suits stemming from all eligible mergers
grew from 20/o-3% in 2000-2003 to 200/,25% in 2010-2014 with average gross returns
rising from 39.4% in 2000-2007 to 88.3% in 2008-2014 and that individual investorpetitioners decreased from 60.8% during 2000-2007 to 46.2% from 2008-2014).
61 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) ("[he Court shall determine the fair value of the
shares ...
62 Id.

together with interest ..

" (emphasis added)).

6 See Jiang et al., supra note 3, at 720-21 (stating that the average value improvement
is 50.6% while the average return from interest accrual is 57.8%, which is considerably
larger than that from value improvement).
64 See id. (stating that accruing interest both boosts returns and "completely eliminates
the downside risk").
65 See Allison L. Land & Lisa P. Ogust, Amendments to DGCL Limit Appraisal
Proceedings,DEL. Bus. CT. INSIDER (Aug. 24, 2016), http://www.delbizcourt.comlid=1202765
835862/Amendments-to-DGCL-Limit-Appraisal-Proceedings?slreturn=20160820114012
(noting that it takes more than 800 days from the merger's closing for the court to make a
decision in an appraisal proceeding on average).
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strategy in most situations. 66 The fact that 6% of the appraisal
suits filed between 2000 and 2014 had positive returns solely
67
because of interest underscores the efficacy of this strategy.
Delaware's Vice Chancellor Glasscock even voiced concern about §
68
262(h) provision encouraging appraisal arbitrage.
2. Transkaryotic Holding. Many credit the court's holding in
Transkaryotic as another factor that led to the increase in
appraisal arbitrage. 69 This case specifically addressed the tension
between today's securities practices and appraisal rights. 70 In
Transkaryotic, Cede, a share depository whose shares are not
71
differentiable and whose beneficial owners are indistinguishable,
was the record holder for approximately 29,700,000 Transkaryotic
shares and perfected the appraisal procedure for approximately
16,800,000 of those shares. 72 The hedge fund-petitioners sought
appraisal for approximately 11,000,000 of Cede's 16,800,000
appraisal-eligible shares, 8,000,000 of which were bought after the
record date. 73 The petitioners did not have voting rights for those
8,000,000 shares and no mechanism existed to verify how each of

66 See Mei, supra note 6, at 84 (claiming that the 5.75% rate of return makes appraisal
arbitrage a lucrative and attractive investment strategy even if the merger was fair (citation
omitted)).
67 See Jiang et al., supra note 3, at 721 n.20 (noting that 6.9% of the petitioners that filed
appraisal suits from January 2000 until December 2014 had positive returns because
interest was factored into their recovery).
68 See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 35, at 1580 ('Vice chancellor Glasscock, too has voiced a
concern about whether the interest rate that the Legislature has set encourages these types of
appraisal cases."' (quoting Transcript of Scheduling Conference at 18, In re ISN Software
Corp. Appraisal Litig., No. 8388-VCG, 2016 WL 4275388 (Del. Ch. Oct. 14, 2013))).
69 No. CIV.A. 1554-cc, 07 WL 1378345 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2007); see Mei, supra note 6, at 84
(internal citation omitted) (accrediting the Court's decision in Transkaryotic as one of the
"main contributors" of appraisal arbitrage); see Geis, supra note 12, at 1650 (claiming that
Delaware's holding in Transkaryotic is one of the factors that "opened the door" to amplified
appraisal claims); Feirstein et al.,supra note 31, at 1 (stating that Transkaryotic
"significantly increased" arbitrage opportunities).
70 Transkaryotic,2007 WL 1378345, at *5; see also Merion Capital LP v. BMC Software,
Inc., C.A. No. 8900-VCG, 2015 WL 67586, at *5 (Del. Ch. Jan. 5, 2015) (noting "the alleged
intent of the appraisal statute collides with the realities of modern securities practice"
because record holders hold mass quantities of shareholders' shares in fungible bulk).
71 See Geis, supra note 12, at 1637 (indicating that Cede "holds a large pool of
undifferentiated shares and does not specifically trace stock certificates to beneficial owners").
72 Transkaryotic,2007 WL 1378345, at *4.
73 Id. at*1.
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the previous owners voted. 74 The Delaware Court of Chancery
ruled that the shares purchased after the record date could be
appraised so long as the record holder followed the statute's
procedural requirements and the sum of the petitioners' shares
was less than or equal to the number of Cede's appraisal-eligible
shares. 75 This holding essentially condones arbitrageurs freeriding on empty votes and could have pernicious consequences.
For example', suppose that, as is typical with corporate mergers,
half of the seller's shareholders cash out "on the news" of the
merger-that is 50% of the total shares outstanding are sold
between the record date and the vote. 76 Assume further that the
merger gets 80% approval, and a share depository like Cede owns
all 20% of the dissenting shares. It is possible that five different
hedge funds each buy one-fifth of the shares sold on the news of
the merger and each claim ownership of the half of Cede's
dissenting shares (10% of the voting shares). Considering that "no
petition can be dismissed," 77 Delaware courts will have a difficult
time resolving this issue. This hypothetical led George Geis to the
conclusion that appraisal claims in Delaware may be "individually
78
colorable, but collectively asinine."
In essence, recovering above-market interest on shares bought
after the record date makes appraisal rights a profitable tool for
hedge funds and may be responsible for the recent increase in
appraisal petitions. 79 The above-market interest is 5% higher than
federal interest and accrues every quarter, thus mitigating a
petitioner's risk by generating profit even on verdicts that favor the
corporation. Likewise, appraising shares bought after the record
date exploits free-riding opportunities through empty voting.

74 See Geis, supra note 12, at 1637 (stating that there was "no possible way to know ... how
the stock ultimately purchased by the petitioners was voted by the previous owners").
75 Transkaryotic, 2007 WL 1378345, at *4.
76 See Geis, supra note 12, at 1656 (observing that it is common practice for half of the
target's shareholders to sell their stock "on the news" of the merger).
77 Id. at 1657.
78 Id.
79 See Jiang et al., supra note 3, at 699 (showing that subsequent appraisal petitions on
appraisal-eligible transactions jumped from 20/o-3% in the early 2000s to approximately
25% in the 2010s).
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B. AMENDMENTS TO § 262

The rise in appraisal petitions led the Delaware State Bar's
Corporate Law Counsel to propose amendments to subsections (g)
and (h) of § 262 that were enacted on August 1, 2016.80 The
amendment to § 262(g) establishes a de minimis threshold
whereby the petitioners' shares must represent either 1% of the
outstanding shares or must exceed $1,000,000 in value, except in
short-form mergers.8 1 On the other hand, the amendment to
§ 262(h) gives the surviving corporation the option to pay the
82
petitioners any amount of the merger consideration at any time.
As to § 262(g), research suggests that this change may
disqualify 21% of appraisal claims.8 3 Yet, critics argue that the
cost of litigating an appraisal suit in tandem with the uncertainty
of the court ruling in the petitioner's favor have comparable
deterrent effects.8 4 By and large, this provision helps synthesize
the competing interests of corporations and minority shareholders
with nominal shareholdings. The former avoids being leveraged
into settlement by nuisance claims, while the latter may still
petition for appraisal rights so long as the aggregate number of
85
appraisal-eligible shares surpasses the threshold.
Meanwhile, the amendment to § 262(h) should reduce a
petitioner's ultimate recovery considering the prepaid amount does

8 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(g)-(h) (West 2017); see Steven Davidoff Solomon, A ThreePronged Front to Limit Shareholder Litigation, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2015), http://www.nyti
mes.com/2015/04/03/business/dealbook/a-three-pronged-front-to-limit-shareholder-litigation.h
tml?_r=O (noting that the Corporate Bar's proposal resulted from appraisal arbitrage and high
interest rates); Daniel Rice, Proposed DGCL Amendments Alter Short-Form Mergers,
Appraisal Rights, 30 WESTLAW J. DEL. CORP., no. 19, at *2 (Mar. 28, 2016) (stating that the
council wanted the changes to curb frivolous appraisal actions).
81 Tit. 8, § 262(g).
82 Id. § 262(h).
M See Jiang et al., supra note 3, at 709 (claiming that the new de minimis exception
would have disqualified 21.6% of the appraisal petitions between 2000-2014).
84 See id. at 719 (arguing that the $1 million cutoff is indistinguishable, both economically
and statistically, from zero because of the high costs and uncertainty involved with appraisal
litigation).
85 See Land & Ogust, supra note 65 (indicating that the de minimis threshold is
measured by the aggregate shareholdings of all petitioners and minimizes the risk of
nuisance claimants using appraisal rights as a tool to coerce corporations into settling).
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not accrue interest.8 6
Corporate defendants that pay the
petitioners at the proceeding's outset attenuate the risk of paying
the petitioners above-market prices for their shares.8 7 This may
reduce arbitrageurs' expected returns and consequentially lower
88
future corporate buyers' risk of post-closing appraisal costs.
However, the consequences of § 262(h)'s amendment may cut
the other way. Many argue that an upfront payment will increase
appraisal arbitrage because prepaying solves the arbitrageurs'
liquidity problems, attenuates the arbitrageurs' risk, and may be
recycled to fund other appraisal claims.8 9 Others argue that this
amendment removes the incentives to settle because corporations
avoid paying above-market interest and petitioners are illiquid for
less time. 9°
But, a balancing issue arises when one considers the arguments
that the proponents and the opponents of § 262(h)'s amendment
make. Corporations must pay enough to significantly discount the
amount payable to the petitioners without funding more appraisal
suits. Further complicating this balancing, what happens if the

86 See tit. 8, § 262(h) (noting that interest only accrues "upon the sum of (1) the
difference, if any, between the amount so paid and the fair value of the shares.., and (2)
interest theretofore accrued, unless paid at that time").
87 See Jiang et al., supra note 3, at 720 (stating that the average return from interest

accrual is 57.8%).
88 See id. at 729 (attributing the positive returns of 6.9% of appraisal petitioners between

2000 and 2014 to interest).
89 See Abigail Pickering Bomba et al., How Appraisal Statute Amendments Would Affect
Mergers, LAW 360 (Mar. 25, 2015, 3:33 PM), https://www.cscglobal.com/cscglobal/pdfs/2014-J
unel3-CLE/26.Huff%/o2Ov.%20CKx.pdf (claiming that upfront payments in appraisal cases
"significantly reduce" petitioners' risk of bringing an appraisal claim); Timothy W. Gregg &
Rebecca L. Butcher, The Latest Significant Delaware AppraisalDecisions and PotentialEffects
on Appraisal Litigation, BUS. L. TODAY (Oct. 2015), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/
blt/2015/10/03_gregg.html (arguing that petitioners may redeploy funds into other appraisal
claims); Steven M. Hecht, Proposed Changes to Delaware Appraisal Statute OK'd by
Delaware House, APPRAISAL RIGHTS LITIG. BLOG (May 16, 2016), http-//www.appraisalrightsli
tigation.com12016/05/16/proposed-changes-to-delaware-appraisal-statute-okd-by-delaware-ho
use/ (explaining that this amendment has the unintended consequence of leading to an
"increased [ ] number of appraisal filings by ameliorating an investor's illiquidity problem");
Steven Davidoff Solomon, Delaware Effort to Protect Shareholders May End Up Hurting
Them, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com2016/05/25/business/dealbook/de
laware-effort-to-protect-shareholders-may-end-up-hurting-them.html?ref-dealbook&-r=
(criticizing this amendment for possibly spurring more appraisal actions because hedge
funds are paid sooner and are able to recycle that money into other appraisal suits).
90 See Bomba et al., supra note 89 (claiming that corporations settle to avoid the accrual
of interest while petitioners settle to reduce the time waiting for payment).
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court finds that the transaction was actually overpriced? 91 The
.corporation may struggle to retrieve the prepaid amount
considering the amendment makes no mention of a claw-back
mechanism. 92 Of course, the court will not let petitioners be
unjustly enriched, but prepayments redirect the petitioners'
illiquidity problem onto the corporation. Buyers in leveraged or
distressed transactions reasonably favor liquidity, and yet these
93
transactions are typically most vulnerable to appraisal arbitrage.
Moreover, this amendment fails to address another cause that
contributes to arbitrageurs' high returns-the millions of dollars'
worth of shares that arbitrageurs get appraised. In fact, between
2004 and 2013, seven hedge funds petitioned for appraisal rights
94
over shares that had a gross value of nearly $1.1 billion.
Altogether, Delaware's current appraisal environment is the
result of various factors. Interest returns and arbitrageurs buying
95
shares after the record date are among the most noted factors.
Recent amendments to § 262(g) and (h) are steps in the right
direction to resolve nuisance claims and interest returns.
However, these amendments might not sufficiently restore
certainty in Delaware mergers or in appraisal proceedings. If
unchanged, Delaware corporations may take it upon themselves to
resolve this issue and wind up harming non-petitioning
shareholders.

91 See, e.g., Gearreald v. Just Care, Inc., C.A. No. 5233-VCP, 2012 WL 1569818, at *1
(Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2012) (ruling that the $40M merger had a lower fair value price of $34M).
92 See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (West 2017).
93 See E-mail from Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP et al., on Proposed Legislation on
Appraisal to Norman M. Monhait, Council on the Corp. Law Section of the Del. State Bar
Ass'n, and Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Professor of Corp. and Bus. Law, Widener's Inst. of
Del. (Apr. 1, 2015) (claiming that leverage transactions are vulnerable to the effects of
appraisal arbitrage); Feirstein et al., supra note 29, at 1 (claiming that distressed sales, PE
buyouts, or management buyouts attract appraisal arbitrageurs).
4 See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 35, at 1574 tbl.1 (showing the value of shares that
seven hedge funds got appraised between 2004 and 2013).
95 See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text (identifying economic consequences of
accrued interest being factored into an appraisal award, and also noting scholarly works
that rebuke the appraisal of shares bought after the record date claiming that such
imprimatur contributes to the increase in appraisal arbitrage).
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IV. APPRAISAL ARBITRAGE LEFT UNRESOLVED

Some argue that Delaware's legislature and § 262's recent
amendments underestimate the damage appraisal arbitrage
causes and that more legislative action is needed to assist
corporate buyers with quantifying and mitigating the risk of
exorbitant post-closing costs. 96 Currently, the acquirer is liable for
the difference in an appraisal rights suit,97 and studies show that

hedge funds utilize appraisal rights as a billion-dollar strategy to
make near riskless profit. 98 Good faith offers receiving majority
approval but still resulting with arbitrageurs recovering millions
in appraisal suits is just one way appraisal arbitrage jeopardizes
deal value. 99 Corporate buyers may harm the non-petitioning
shareholders by resorting to self-help to eliminate or at least
mitigate this uncertainty through restructuring the deal, lowering
the offers, or including provisions that limit appraisal risk. 10 0
A. BUYER SELF-HELP OPTIONS

There are a few self-help strategies that buyers may use to
mitigate the risk of subsequent appraisal rights petitions. First,
buyers may restructure deals and utilize a corporate combination
that does not trigger appraisal rights, such as an asset
purchase.10 1
Even though the seller's shareholders vote on

9 See Mei, supra note 6, at 91 (calling on Delaware's legislature to resolve the tension
between appraisal arbitrage and the policy behind appraisal rights); see also E-mail from
Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP et al., supra note 93 (claiming that relief "properly lies with
[Delaware's] Legislature" (quoting In re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, No. Civ. A.
1554-CC, 2007 WL 1378345, at *5 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2007)).
97 Korsmo & Myers, supra note 35, at 1588.
98 See Jetley & Ji, supra note 39, at 428 (noting that Merion Capital, a prominent hedge
fund-petitioner, has $1 billion dedicated to appraisal petitions (citing Liz Hoffman, Hedge
Funds Plan to Seek Higher Price for Safeway, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.wsj.
com/articles/hedge-funds-plan-to-seek-higher-price-for-safeway-1422913728)).
9 See, e.g., In re Appraisal of Dell Inc. C.A. No. 9322-VCL, 2016 WL 3186538, at *34 (Del.
Ch. May 31, 2016) (noting that the transacting parties negotiated in good faith and that
neither party aimed to exploit the valuation disconnect arising from a management buyout).

100 See infra Part W.A.
101 See Hariton v. Arco Elecs., Inc., 182 A.2d 22, 25 (Del. Ch. 1962) (stating that asset
sales, unlike mergers, do not trigger appraisal rights), affd, 188 A.2d 123 (Del. 1963).
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10 2
whether to sell all or a significant amount of the seller's assets,
dissenting shareholders are less of a liability because they are not
entitled to appraisal rights.
Second, buyers may reduce the amount payable to the seller's
shareholders in one of two ways. The buyer may offer a lower
amount initially or may contract a provision that retroactively
lowers the accepted amount. 10 3 The former approach uses the
"saved" amount as a colloquial carrot to subdue shareholders who
are threatening to file for appraisal rights. Ironically this diverts
profits from the non-petitioning shareholders to the petitioning

shareholders. 104
The latter approach, called differential pricing, is a colloquial
stick. Differential pricing transposes the risk of post-closing costs
onto the seller's shareholders by retroactively reducing the merger
price if a certain percentage of shareholders petition for appraisal
rights. 105 There is a similar irony with this approach considering
that only the petitioners have an opportunity to profit while the
non-petitioning shareholders receive less for their shares. This
may explain why closing conditions are not prevalent in the
current deal market. Nevertheless, some experts believe that
buyers might reconsider including a differential pricing provision
06
in order to combat the risk of appraisal arbitrage.1
Finally, a buyer may include appraisal conditions, either
independently or at the direction of a lender, that cap the buyer's

102

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271(a) (West 2017); see BAUMAN & STEVENSON, supra note 48,

at 582 ("[The Seller's] shareholders must approve [an asset purchase], but unlike in other
forms of corporate combinations they do not have appraisal rights.').
103 See Trevor Norwitz, DelawarePoised to Embrace Appraisal Arbitrage, HARV. L. SCH.F.
ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG. (Mar. 9, 2015), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/

that buyers may lower
03/09/delaware-poised-to-embrace-appraisal-arbitrage/-(claiming
acquisition offerings to all of the seller's shareholders or include a closing condition in
response to this "new category of hold-up artists").
104 See id. (noting that buyers might hold back an incremental value to "grease the
squeaky wheels" in response to increasing appraisal arbitrage and criticizing this system
for siphoning off profits that are "diverted to short-term speculators in appraisal rights").
106 See id. (noting that acquirers may utilize differential pricing as self-help, which
automatically reduces the merger's price if too many shareholders petition for appraisal
rights).
106 See Feirstein et al., supra note 31, at 2 (claiming that closing conditions are not common
in the current deal market but may become common as appraisal claims continue to increase).
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appraisal rights risk. 10 7 Appraisal conditions, or appraisal clauses,
have a trigger similar to differential pricing, but instead of
retroactively reducing the price when a certain percentage of the
seller's shareholders petition for appraisal rights, the transaction
is terminated. 108 In theory, this difference might deter on-thefence shareholders from petitioning for appraisal rights because
appraisal proceedings are conditioned upon transactions closing.109
Moreover, consequences of the merger dissolving may outweigh
the costs of selling one's shares at a discounted price because the
dissolution might harm the seller's marketability. For example,
AbbVie Inc., a pharmaceutical company, withdrew its offer to
acquire Shire plc. and even paid Shire a $1.6 billion breakup fee.
Although Shire made $1.6 billion, AbbVie terminating the deal
caused Shire's stock to plummet 26%.110
B. PROBLEMS WITH BUYER SELF-HELP

Although buyers restructuring the deal, lowering the price, or
adding a contractual provision may improve certainty in Delaware
mergers, the propriety of these options is questionable. First of
all, asset purchases might be difficult to execute as they require
majority shareholder approval."'
Offers for successful, nondistressed corporations are unlikely to receive majority approval

107 See John A. Bick, Interest Rate Risk and Appraisal Risk in M&A Transactions, HARV.
L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG. (Aug. 24, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harv
ard.edu/2016/08/24/interest-rate-risk-and-appraisal-risk-in-ma-transactions/ (claiming that
parties to M&A deals and their lenders may use contractual provisions to limit appraisal
risk); Norwitz, supra note 103 (expecting more appraisal conditions if Delaware's legislature
gives appraisal arbitrage imprimatur).
1os See Mei, supra note 6, at 89-90 (defining an appraisal condition as a tool that
discontinues a transaction if a specified percentage of outstanding shares petition for
appraisal rights).
101See In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., C.A. No. 9322-vcl, 2016 WL 3186538, at *24 (Del. Ch.
May 31, 2016) (stating that courts determine the shares' fair value on the date of the deal's
closing).
110 See David Gelles, After Tax Inversion Rules Change, AbbVie and Shire Agree to
Terminate Their Deal, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Oct. 20, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2014/10/20/abbvie-and-shire-agreetoterminate-their-deall?_r=0 (reporting that the seller's
stock declined more than 26% after the potential buyer backed out of the transaction).
ill DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271(a) (West 2017).
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queue and are
because the shareholders are last in the financial
112
paid after the seller's other creditors are paid.
Likewise, lower offers negatively affect the shareholders'
ultimate financial position. 11 3 Prophylactically lowering the initial
offer to abate litigation expenses is counterintuitive considering
the risk of the lower offer attracting more appraisal petitions. On
the other hand, if no subsequent appraisal litigation ensues, then
the shareholders involuntarily forfeited profit based on an
uncertain happening. This lose-lose situation may be seen as
unfair treatment and evoke shareholder activism. For example,
the merits of Dell's going-private merger provoked Carl Icahn to
propose a proxy contest and then threaten to seek appraisal rights
over 72 million shares. 14 Icahn's actions earned shareholders an
additional $400 million.115
Additionally, the shortcomings of closing conditions and
appraisal conditions are akin. The crux of these shortcomings is
that a minority shareholder holding nominal equity could create a
hold-up, 11 6 a threat that further impinges on the transaction's
certainty. 17 Not only are these conditions avoidable by deal
restructuring,1 1 8 they are also incongruent with § 262's policy by
revitalizing the very conduct that majority voting and appraisal

112 See RHEE, supra note 30, at 146-47 (stating that common stockholders bear the
greatest economic risk in an asset purchase because they are last in the financial queue to
receive distributions); BAUMAN & STEVENSON, supra note 46, at 581-82 (discussing the
purchaser's ability to assume the seller's liability, noting that if the purchaser does not,
then the shareholders divide the remaining consideration after the seller satisfies its
liabilities and dissolves).
113See supra notes 103-05, 107 and accompanying text.
114 Dell, 2016 WL 3186538, at *17, *19.
115 See Abigail Pickering Bomba et al., New Activist Weapon - The Rise of Delaware
AppraisalArbitrage:A Survey of Cases and Some PracticalImplications,M&A Briefing, FRIED
FRANK 3 (June 18, 2014), http://www.friedfrank.comsiteFilesPublhcations/FINAL%20-%2061
82014%20TOC%20Memo%20-%2ONew%20Activist%2Weapon--%20The%2Rise%20ofo2OD
elaware%20Appraisal%2OArbitrage.pdf (stating that Icahn's appraisal threat "effectively
blocked the required shareholder vote.., and led to a $400 million increase in the merger
price paid to shareholders").
116 Minority shareholders may create a hold-up on fundamental transactions that include
either an appraisal or a closing condition because shareholder voting is required and is
"prim [ary] in [Delaware's] system of corporate governance .... " Carmody v. Toll Bros., Inc.,
723 A.2d 1180, 1193 (Del. Ch. 1998).
117 See Feirstein et al., supra note 31, at 2 (noting that closing conditions may impair deal
certainty because a relatively small shareholder can create a hold-up).

118 Id.
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rights aimed to do away with-minority veto power.1 1 9 For
example, if the agreement in Dell included an appraisal condition,
then Carl Icahn may have had a veto power with his 72 million
shares, which represented nearly 4.1% of Dell's outstanding
shares. 120 Theoretically, mergers that include appraisal conditions
vest every shareholder with a veto power if one more petition
meets or surpasses the triggering percentage.
As discussed previously, without certainty that the price
negotiated will be the price paid, buyers may seek to limit their
risk by resorting to self-help. Buyers may restructure the deal,
lower the offer, or include conditions that limit potential appraisal
costs, such as closing conditions or appraisal conditions. 121 These
self-help remedies are transaction-specific and do not resolve the
systemic uncertainty that corporate buyers in Delaware face.
Moreover, non-petitioning shareholders may receive lower
offerings or may be stuck with shares that are less marketable.
Finally, conditions that limit appraisal rights are incongruent with
Delaware's policy because they revitalize the veto power that
appraisal rights negated.1 22 It may be advantageous to seek
pragmatic alternatives that make appraisal rights and
transactional certainty more compatible.
V. SOLUTION: RECORD DATE CUT-OFF USING A CENTRALIZED

DATABASE
Appraisal petitions and post-closing costs have a positive
relationship-an increase to the former evokes a reciprocal increase
to the latter.
Delaware's current appraisal environment
insufficiently balances minority protection and corporate autonomy
as hedge funds exploit arbitrage opportunities using appraisal
119See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text (identifying that appraisal rights
became an alternative to unanimous consent to negate minority shareholders' veto power
and to ensure that dissenting shareholders are fairly compensated).
120 See In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., C.A. No. 9322-VCL, 2016 WL 3186538, at *17, *51 (Del.
Ch. May 31, 2016) (noting that Icahn had approximately 72 million of Dell's 1,765,369,276
fully diluted outstanding shares). Notably, Ichan was not an ultimate petitioner; instead the
petitioners were hedge funds seeking appraisal over 922,975 shares. In re Appraisal of Dell
Inc., Consol. C.A. No. 9322-VCL, 2015 WL 4313206, at *3 (Del. Ch. July 30, 2015).
121 See supra Part IV.A.
122 See supra note 119 and accompanying text (discussing the policies and rationale
behind appraisal rights).
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rights and undermines the transacting parties' certainty that the
closing price will be the final price. 123 One writer compared
Delaware's appraisal system to a building with an insufficient
electrical system whose owner continuously snakes extension cords
throughout the building instead of remedying the mediocre fuse
box. 24 This Note urges Delaware's legislature to remedy the broken
fuse box by only appraising shares that the petitioners owned on the
record date and, in the process, to centralize share trading.
A. RECORD DATE CUT-OFF EXPLAINED

Appraisal rights do not have a contemporaneous ownership,
requirement, 12 5 and the statute only requires that a petitioner own
shares when making the demand and continue to hold "such
shares through the effective date of the merger .... ,,126 Unlike
other states that require the demand to include the number of
shares for which appraisal is being sought, 27 Delaware simply
requires petitioners to note their identity and their intent to seek
appraisal rights. 128 This gives arbitrageurs the ability to buy and
sell shares between the record date and the merger vote. 29 As
discussed above, buying shares after the record date facilitates
free-riding on others' votes and enables hedge funds to use
appraisal rights as a strategic tool. 30 The prevalence of this

See Mei, supra note 6, at 89 (identifying transactional uncertainty as a "major
implication" of appraisal arbitrage by hedge funds); Norwitz, supra note 103 (claiming that
appraisal arbitrage's deal-threatening and value-destructive nature is an "unquantifiable
risk" that warrants action); E-mail from Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP et al., supra note 58
(writing about appraisal arbitrage's negative impact); see also Bick, supra note 107 (noting
that the recent amendment to section 262(h) addresses the interest rate risk but fails to
assist buyers in managing the deal risk, a longstanding issue that remains unaddressed).
124 Geis, supra note 12, at 1665.
125 See Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, Aggregation by Acquisition: Replacing Class
Actions With a Market for Legal Claims, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1323, 1371 (2016) (stating there
is no contemporaneous ownership requirement in Delaware appraisal suits).
126 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a) (West 2017).
127 See supranote 38 and accompanying text.
12 Tit. 8, § 262(d)(1).
129 See In re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies Inc., No. Civ. A. 1554-cc, 2007 WL
1378345, at *4 (ruling that shares bought after the record date may be appraised).
130 See supra Part II.A. 1-2.
123
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strategy underscores its efficacy. 131 Therefore, Delaware should
adopt a contemporaneous ownership requirement similar to the
requirement in derivative suits that prevents arbitrageurs from
exploiting empty voting while still allowing them to act as
shareholder activists.
Shareholders involved in derivative suits must have
contemporaneous ownership by owning shares at the time of the
wrongdoing. 132
Contemporaneous ownership prevents an
opportunistic buyer from taking an equity stake in a corporation
after the harm has been done and realizing a windfall
proportionate to his pro rata shares. 133 Similar to how the
contemporaneous ownership requirement in derivative suits
thwarts investors from receiving a windfall benefit, a
contemporaneous ownership requirement in appraisal suits might
prevent arbitrageurs from receiving the windfall benefit that
arises when they continue buying shares after the record date and
justify their claims by free-riding on empty votes. 13 4
However, the legitimacy of this solution relies on when the
harm to shareholders occurs.
This Note contends that
shareholders are harmed when the buyer makes the undervalued
offer because that might be the buyer's last action and we want to
punish the buyer for the buyer's actions. Having the harm occur at
the later point may punish the buyer for the seller's actions, for
example, accepting the merger offer. The latter approach punishes
the buyer for actions besides his own and forces the buyer to
assume the consequences of empty voting. A record date cut-off
best reflects the notion that making an undervalued offer is wrong
and avoids the practical consequences of empty voting.13 5
"I1See

supra note 52 (providing cases where petitioners bought shares after the record

date); Jiang et al., supra note 3, at 704 (showing that appraisal suits stemming from all
eligible mergers increased from 2o-3% in 2000-2003 to 209/-25% in 2010-2014).
182 See BAuMAN & STEVENSON, supra note 48, at 715 (stating that contemporaneous
ownership requires that shareholders have shares at the time of the wrongdoing).
133 Id.
at 716.
134 See Jetley & Ji, supra note 39, at 441 (claiming that a record date cut-off prevents
empty voting and ensures that all of the seller's shareholders are treated equally, assume
the deal's risk, and actually vote instead of freeriding on others' votes).
133See In re Appraisal of Transkaryotic, Inc., No. CIV.A.1554-cc, 2007 WL 1378345, at *9
(Del. Ch. May 2, 2007) (illustrating Delaware's opposition to voting shareholders receiving
undervalued offers because it enables the majority to exploit majority approval and
indirectly force minority shareholders into selling their equity at less-than-fair-value-the
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On the other side of the record, setting the cut-off at the
proposed merger's announcement is detrimental because it
136 A healthy appraisal
eliminates appraisal arbitrage altogether.
arbitrage market benefits society because arbitrageurs resolve
collective action problems, serve as back-end checks for fair
pricing, and protect minority shareholders from expropriation by
the majority. 137 Setting the cut-off at the record date still enables
arbitrageurs to serve these functions. Research on appraisal
rights filings shows an average gap of fifty-four days between the
138 This gap
proposed merger announcement and the record date.
provides sufficient time for arbitrageurs to gather information,
evaluate competing proposals, account for new macroeconomic or
firm-specific developments, and conduct their own financial
13 9
analysis to determine whether this is a profitable venture.
Moreover, arbitrageurs may still profit if new information becomes
available after the record date by exercising their rights under
§ 262(e) and retroactively accepting the merger offer.140
Limiting judicial appraisal to only those shares owned on the
record date is an ideal solution because it best synthesizes society's
interest in having appraisal arbitrageurs and the arbitrageurs'
interests in profiting from an appraisal suit. A record date cut-off
eliminates arbitrageurs free-riding on empty votes while still
4
enabling them to act as shareholder activists.' ' Additionally, the
time between the merger announcement and the record date is
sufficiently long for arbitrageurs to calculate the merits of a
merger 142 Therefore, Delaware's legislature should adopt this
very conduct that appraisal rights aimed to remedy); see also Geis, supra note 12, at 165657 (using an example to illustrate how Delaware's appraisal rights statute makes individual
claims "colorable, but collectively asinine').
136 Existing shareholders would not have time to sell their shares nor would hedge funds be
able to evaluate the merits of the offer and take an equity position in the selling company.
137 Korsmo & Myers, supra note 35, at 1555.
138 Jetley & Ji, supra note 39, at 441.
139 See id. (claiming that arbitrageurs assess the merits and potential payoffs of an
appraisal action based on information that is public "well before the record date" and that
delaying investments until the record date is sufficient to observe the merger arbitrage
spread, collect new information, such as macroeconomic or firm-specific developments, and
assess potential risks).
140 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(e) (West 2017).
141 See supra notes 134-40.
142 See Jetley & Ji, supra note 39, at 441 (claiming that fifty-four days typically elapse
between the merger announcement and record date).
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unequivocal standing requirement and reduce the transactional
uncertainty that appraisal arbitrage causes.
B. RESTRUCTURING SECURITIES EXCHANGES AND DEPOSITORY
SYSTEMS

The biggest obstacle to a record date cut-off derives from
depository systems, like Cede, holding unidentifiable shares in
fungible bulk and the wide gap between record holders and
beneficial owners. 143
Both legal professionals and Delaware
adjudicators acknowledge the depository system's shortcomings
and its influence on appraisal arbitrage. 1' However, a centralized
database that monitors and records real-time beneficial owners of
specific shares may resolve these issues by verifying the
petitioners' going-concern interests. The share-specific chain of
title that this centralized database creates may also make proxy
distributions more efficient and appraisal claims more transparent
and reliable, while conferring on Delaware adjudicators the ability
to redefine meritorious appraisal claims.
An effective central database assigns and tracks encrypted
identification numbers unique to individual corporate shares, as
well as to individual shareholders, to accommodate today's highfrequency trading.145 Shares may receive their unique number upon
their initial issuance while shareholders receive their unique

143See supra notes 69-72 (noting that share depositories holding shares in fungible bulk
creates a gap between record holders and beneficial owners).
144See Geis, supra note 12, at 1651-52 (attributing the use of central record holders as
being partially responsible for rendering Delaware's appraisal statutes incoherent); see also
In re Appraisal of Dell, Inc., Consol. C.A. No. 9322-VCL, 2015 WL 4313206, at *23 (Del. Ch.
July 30, 2015) (stating that the share depository system needs to be reassessed due to its
influence on appraisal arbitrage).
145 See X. Frank Zhang, High-Frequency Trading, Stock Volatility, and Price Discovery 5
(Dec. 2010) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=-1691679 (identifying that
high-frequency trading companies, such as hedge funds and broker-dealer proprietary trading
desks, account for approximately 73% of the U.S. stock market trading volume); Press Release,
U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, SEC Proposes Large Trader Reporting System (Apr. 14, 2010),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-55.htm (recognizing the importance of monitoring
market participants engaging in substantial trading activity, obtaining information about the
market impact, analyzing the participants' trading activity, and keeping up with the
"increasingly prominent role [of high-frequency traders] in the securities markets').
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number upon the creation of a trading account. 146 Putting these two
of
unique codes together creates an exact chain of title for any share
147
system.
opaque
currently
a
in
accountability
stock and fosters
Corporations may utilize this database at various times in the
merger. For example, corporations may use this system at the
beginning of the merger process to quickly identify real-time
beneficial owners in order to supply the necessary voting
information and set the record date. 148 Shareholders may validate
the merits of their demands by including their respective
identification number or the identification numbers of their
shares, similar to the share certificates that New York and Texas
require in their demands. 14 9 However, if Delaware wants the
demand to remain simple, then the database may be used to
validate the merits of each petitioner's claim by documenting how
each share voted and by whom.1 50 Utilizing the database in these
ways reduces the equivocation of empty voting,' 5' a pivotal issue in
Transkaryotic.152
Moreover, this restructuring creates a wide range of possible
ways to define a "meritorious" claim. One option uses the
database's real-time trade monitoring to provide the new
shareholders with the voting rights for shares bought after the
The corporation would simply provide the new
record date.
shareholder with pertinent voting information and let that
shareholder vote accordingly. 53 A second option mirrors the
incumbent system by holding the new shareholder accountable for

See Geis, supra note 12, at 1665 (suggesting that electronic securities transfers would
benefit from shares having share-specific encryptions and from shareholders having unique
identification codes that were created upon opening a trading account).
147 See, e.g., id. n.173 (illustrating how the chain of title would be created).
148 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 213(a) (West 2017) (detailing the required information
that must be dispersed to shareholders and the procedure for setting the record date).
149 See generally N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 623(c) (McKinney 2017); TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE
ANN. § 10.356(b)(3)(D) (West 2017).
150 See Geis, supra note 12, at 1667 (suggesting that the share identification system could
reliably validate how shares voted).
151 See id. at 1656-57 (illustrating the asinine results that unregulated empty voting may
create).
152 See generally supra Part III.A.2.
153 See Geis, supra note 12, at 1667 (noting that shareholders who bought shares after the
announcement but before the vote could be sent information and acquire the share's voting
rights).
146
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the selling shareholder's vote. 154 Although this option still allows
empty voting, it reduces the ambiguity surrounding the propriety
of arbitrageurs' claims and prevents the asinine results that the
current system facilitates because the vote of individual share(s) is
transparent. 155
Additionally, holding the buying shareholder
accountable for the selling shareholder's vote may encourage the
buyer to obtain an irrevocable proxy-thereby giving the buyer the
15 6
voting right-from the seller if he feels strongly about the vote.
In this scenario as well, the ambiguity incumbent upon an
arbitrageur's share is ameliorated because the individual share's
transaction history is transparent.
In short, centralizing securities exchanges resolves appraisal
rights' shortcomings through verification and validation. Giving
each share and shareholder unique identification numbers creates a
chain of title that resolves share depositories' fungible bulk issues
and makes appraisal procedures more efficient.1 57 Additionally, it
gives Delaware a few options to define what a "meritorious" claim
is, either giving the buying shareholder the share's voting rights or
holding the buyer accountable for the seller's vote. 158 In effect, the
impact of this change may enhance appraisal rights and possibly
improve corporate governance overall.
C. COLLATERAL BENEFITS

Centralizing share databases further benefits corporate
governance by reducing the incumbent system's ambiguities. These
benefits might ameliorate uncertainty in routine voting matters,
agency problems arising from beneficial owners and record holders,
and proxy distribution.
Furthermore, investors, managers,
adjudicators, and the economy might benefit from restructuring the
share exchanging system into a centralized database.
First, routine voting matters, such as elections, may benefit
from this restructuring by imparting confidence that the majority
or plurality vote accurately reflects the relevant shareholders'
Id.
155 See id. at 1656-57 (illustrating the asinine results that the current system facilitates).
156 See id. at 1667 n.177 (noting the usefulness of a centralized database for obtaining an
irrevocable proxy from the selling shareholder).
157 See supra notes 144-52 and accompanying text.
158 See supra notes 153-56 and accompanying text.
164
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sentiments. 159 Likewise, a centralized database might be useful in
litigation arising from discrepancies between beneficial owners
and record holders by efficiently dismissing filings that are prima
facie invalid. 160 In fact, the centralized database reduces the need
for enlisting brokers or proxy-solicitation firms that aid with
distributing voting materials in proxy contests. A typical proxy
161
contest costs anywhere from $1 million to $15 million.
Certainly, legal requirements governing proxy communications
and solicitations to shareholders affect this expense, 162 but another
category of expenses affecting the total cost "arises through the
practical need to conduct a political campaign by hiring advisors
(typically lawyers and proxy-solicitation firms) to track beneficial
owners through labyrinths of intermediary owners ... "163
Lastly, a centralized system benefits investors, managers,
adjudicators, and the economy in various ways. Investors benefit
from clearer governance through unequivocal ownership and
possibly higher share values. 164 The chain of title makes their
ownership unequivocal, but curtailing empty voting's ambiguities
might increase the transacting corporations' values by restoring
certainty in the merger's total costs and the seller's
marketability. 165 Managers benefit from a systemic overhaul by
having a direct and complete tool to organize proxy contests, as
noted in the previous paragraph. 66 Adjudicators in Delaware
169 See Geis, supra note 12, at 1667 (suggesting that a centralized stock infrastructure
might provide a new platform for corporate voting and resolve the uncertainties that share
depositories evoke).
160 See, e.g., Kurz v. Holbrook, 989 A-2d 140 (Del. Ch.2010) (adjudicating a dispute where
a record holder improperly transferred voting rights to the beneficial owners in a director
election); Bandell v. TC/GP, Inc., No. 247, 1995, 1996 WL 69789 (Del. Jan. 26, 1996)
(affirming dismissal of Bandell's appraisal petition because he had not established his
status as a record holder).
161 Geis, supra note 12, at 1668 n.179 (citation omitted).
162 See generally 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4 to -5 (2016).
163 Geis, supra note 12, at 1668.
164 See id. at 1669 (claiming that investors benefit from this stock-clearing reform because
of better governance and possibly higher firm values).
165 See, e.g., Gelles, supra note 110 (illustrating how a seller's marketability decreased its
stock price by 26% after a failed merger). The buyer may become more valuable if the seller
is a marketable entity that could be resold and can avoid the millions of dollars an appraisal
suit would cost. See Jiang et al., supranote 3, at 708 (stating that the full costs of bringing
an appraisal case to trial ranges from $3 million to $5 million).
166 See supra text accompanying notes 161-63 (describing how a centralized database evokes
transparency and may make tracking beneficial owners in a proxy contest less expensive); see
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benefit from this restructuring for two interconnected reasons:
first, transparent standing standards, and second, a reliable
database. In tandem, these prevent frivolous strike suits from
Finally, centralizing securities
congesting their dockets. 167
exchanges benefits the economy through money paid to the firms
168
or coders creating and operating the new system.
Although the benefits of changing the record date and
centralizing share exchanges are plenty, there are issues to
overcome. Creating a pseudo-contemporary ownership requirement
for appraisal proceedings complicates Delaware's precedent.
Additionally, someone must design and fund the restructuring of
share exchanges into a centralized database.
As to the first point, some argue against changing the cut-off
because Delaware's precedent recognizes claims by petitioners, so
long as they perfected the appraisal rights requirements. 169 This
circular argument fails to justify the precedent outweighing the
impropriety of allowing petitioners to freeride on and recover for
Without this
shares purchased after the record date.1 70
justification, society is left questioning why a record date cut-off,
which provides arbitrageurs ample opportunity to research, invest,
and serve as activists without undermining the integrity of

also Geis, supra note 12, at 1669 (noting that aspiring managers would benefit from an
efficient way to mount proxy contests).
167 See Norwitz, supra note 103 (noting Delaware courts' unfavorable sentiment toward
appraisal cases becoming a growing part of their dockets because more time is spent
"playing investment banker'). But see Bomba et al., supra note 89 (claiming that the
amendments "will not significantly discourage appraisal [claims] overall").
168 See Geis, supra note 12, at 1669 (claiming that system operators may be profitable so
long as "they can command a reasonable amount for their services").
169 See Norwitz, supra note 103 (discussing Delaware's perspective on recognizing claims
over shares purchased after the merger announcement so long as petitioners perfected the
appraisal rights requirements); Jetley & Ji, supra note 39, at 430 n.10 (noting that the "at
the merger vote" cut-off goes back to at least 1989 when Vice Chancellor Berger wrote the
opinion in Salomon Bros. v. Interstate Bakeries Corp., 576 A.2d 650 (Del. Ch. 1989)).
170 See Jetley & Ji, supra note 39, at 440 (noting the absence of an economic argument
that justifies arbitrageurs freeriding during the period between the record date and deal
closing); see also E-mail from Cravath, Swaine & Moore et al., supra note 93 (claiming that
there is no justification for allowing shareholders to seek appraisal for shares bought after
the record date). Yet, it is this reliance on Delaware precedent that led to the rise in
appraisal arbitrage, arbitrageur freeriding, and consequentially induced uncertainty in
Delaware mergers. See Mei, supra note 6, at 84-85 (claiming the holding in Transkaryotic
is one of the main contributors of appraisal arbitrage and buyer uncertainty).
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Delaware's appraisal system, 17 1 has not resolved this issue that
172
has sparked much criticism.
As to the second issue, effectuating a centralized database has
two hurdles--designing and funding the restructuring. In regard
to designing the restructuring, tracking share trades requires
unique identification numbers for each shareholder and for each
share of corporate stock that is publicly traded.1 73 The real hurdle
is coding an algorithm that monitors and securely records the
nearly 7.5 million trades made daily. 174 In a world where we
organize volumes of internet data to pay dividends to beneficial
175
owners digitally, the technology is available.
Nevertheless, creating the software will be both time-consuming
and expensive. Private software and security firms may voluntarily
take on this task in hopes of profiting; however, because these
efforts may not be rewarded, it is unlikely that a firm will take on
this project and absorb these costs. Therefore, some suggest that
the government should spearhead this campaign. 76 In fact, the
SEC recently discussed a similar restructuring where large traders
would have identification numbers.1 77 In its press release, the SEC
proposed that broker-dealers maintain and report data in a similar
way to the Commission's Electronic Blue Sheets, which enables the
SEC to collect transaction data from the broker-dealers.1 7 8 The only
additional requirement would be for the broker-dealers to maintain
and report large traders' identification numbers and times of their

See supra text accompanying notes 138-39.
See supra note 69 (citing various critics that correlate appraisal arbitrage with
Delaware's imprimatur that shares bought after the record date may receive judicial
appraisal).
173 See Geis, supra note 12, at 1665 n.173 (providing an example of the chain of title that
the unique identification numbers would create).
174 See id. at 1669 n.187 (claiming that in seventy-seven trading days approximately 419
million, 63 million, and 102 million shares were traded on the NYSE, ARCA/AMEX, and
NASDAQ, respectively yielding an average of 7.5 million shares trading each day (citation
omitted)); see also Press Release, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, supra note 145 (noting that
monitoring high frequency trading is needed and difficult to obtain).
175 See Geis, supra note 12, at 1652 (stating that dividend distributions utilize a
comparable "snapshot" approach to determine which beneficial owners receive the dividends
over certain shares).
176 See id. at 1670 (noting that establishing securities reforms to counteract appraisal
arbitrage presents a legitimate case for the government to "bankroll" such action).
177 Press Release, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, supra note 145.
171
172

178

Id.
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transactions. 179 If the SEC worked independently or with an
outside firm to extend this proposal to all shareholders and shares,
the restructuring proposed in this Note could materialize.
VI. CONCLUSION

The recent increase in appraisal rights petitions by appraisal
arbitrageurs in Delaware compromises the negotiating process by
creating uncertainty in the final acquisition cost and potentially
encouraging buyers to resort to self-help mechanisms. Delaware's
legislature can resolve this problem by limiting appraisal rights to
only shares owned by the petitioner on the record date and
restructuring share exchanges into a centralized database. Using
the record date as a cut-off may ameliorate this uncertainty by
preventing arbitrageurs from freeriding while still providing
sufficient time for them to serve as market checks for undervalued
deals.
Likewise, a centralized share database that assigns
individual shares and shareholders a unique identification number
creates a foundation of transparency and accountability. This
database not only benefits transacting parties, but also
shareholders in general, corporations, adjudicators, and the
economy through clearer governance mechanisms. It is for these
reasons that Delaware's legislature should amend its appraisal
rights statute and collaborate with other government agencies or
independent entities to initiate a securities restructuring.

179

Id.
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